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The Limitation on Undocumented Workers’
Lost Earnings After Balbuena and Sanango: Crafting a
Fair and Principled Balance of Immigration Policy and
New York State Labor Law § 240 Safety Goals
By Meredith R. Miller
In December 2004, in a pair of cases, the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that under state labor
and tort laws, injured workers who are not legally per-
mitted to be present or employed in the United States
are only entitled to receive lost earnings reflecting what
they could have earned in their country of origin.1 This
article explores these First Department decisions by first
discussing the federal statutory and decisional back-
drop against which the cases arose. This article then
provides a discussion of the First Department cases and
the competing economic incentives they implicate.
Finally, this article posits that a more appropriate bal-
ance of federal immigration law and New York State
Labor Law § 240 policy is a rule that holds an employer
(or other party) liable for an undocumented worker’s
lost wages only when that employer (or other party)
knew or should have known of the worker’s immigra-
tion status.
The Federal Backdrop: The Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 and Hoffman Plastics
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (“IRCA”)2 as a comprehensive scheme
to prohibit the employment of illegal immigrants in the
United States who are either (1) not lawfully present in
the United States or (2) not lawfully authorized to work
in the United States (collectively, “undocumented work-
ers”).3 Under this system, IRCA mandates that employ-
ers verify the identity and eligibility of all new employ-
ees by examining certain specified documentation
before the employees begin to work.4
To enforce this scheme, the statute employs a two-
prong approach that takes aim at the actions of both
employer and employee.5 IRCA makes it illegal for an
employer to knowingly hire an individual that is unau-
thorized to work or cannot produce the required docu-
mentation. Similarly, an employer cannot continue to
employ a worker upon discovery that the worker is
undocumented or unauthorized to work in the United
States.6 IRCA also makes it a crime for a worker to ten-
der fraudulent documentation to the employer.7 As a
result of IRCA, it is impossible for an undocumented
worker to gain employment in the United States with-
out either the employer or the worker violating the
express prohibitions of the statute, which imposes both
civil and criminal penalties.8
In 2002, Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB9
raised questions concerning the enforceability of federal
labor laws in light of the IRCA scheme. In Hoffman, Jose
Castro, an undocumented worker, operated blending
machines that custom-formulated chemicals for Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, Inc.10 After Castro supported
a union organizing campaign, Hoffman terminated Cas-
tro’s employment in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”).11 To remedy the NLRA viola-
tion, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”),
among other things, awarded Castro back pay.12 At the
hearing to determine the amount of back pay, Castro
testified that he was not lawfully entitled to be present
or employed in the United States. He admitted that he
gained employment with Hoffman after tendering false
documentation in violation of IRCA.13 Thus, the issue
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Hoffman was whether
Castro was entitled to back pay under the NLRA even
though his employment was illegal under IRCA. 
The Supreme Court held that because Castro was
never lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the
United States, he had no right to back pay.14 The Court
concluded that allowing the NLRB to award back pay
to illegal immigrants would “run counter to policies
underlying IRCA” and “unduly trench upon explicit
statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration
policy.”15 The Court was particularly concerned that
allowing back pay under the NLRA would encourage
undocumented workers to violate IRCA—namely, that
it would “encourage the successful evasion of appre-
hension by immigration authorities, condone prior vio-
lations of the immigration laws, and encourage future
violations.”16
The Hoffman Court did not have occasion to address
the impact of its decision on an undocumented work-
er’s right to back pay under state labor and tort laws. 
Sanango and Balbuena: First Department
Decisions Applying Hoffman
Until the recent duo of First Department decisions
in Sanango v. 200 East 16th Street Housing Corp.17 and
Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC,18 no New York appellate
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tion should be applied whether the worker or employer
acted in violation of IRCA.32
On the same day that it issued the Sanango decision,
a partly different First Department majority (Nardelli,
J.P., Tom, Lerner, Friedman, JJ.) issued a decision in Bal-
buena summarily following Sanango.33 Balbuena involved
a similar factual scenario and, thus, raised substantially
the same legal issue as Sanango. Gorgonio Balbuena, an
undocumented worker, sought damages, including lost
wages, for an injury he suffered at a work site.34
Notably, the cases each arrived at the appellate
court with different procedural postures. In Balbuena,
the trial court had denied the employer’s motion for
partial summary judgment dismissing Balbuena’s claim
for lost earnings.35 The First Department majority modi-
fied the trial court judgment on the law to the extent it
granted the employer’s motion for partial summary
judgment, and dismissed the lost earnings claim insofar
as Balbuena sought damages based on the wages that
he might have earned illegally in the United States.36
However, the Balbuena dissent (Ellerin, J.) disagreed
with the reasoning of the Sanango court. The dissent
would have affirmed and allowed a jury to decide
whether Balbuena was entitled to lost earnings.37
The Balbuena Dissent: The Tension of Economic
Incentives to Violate IRCA 
The Balbuena dissent would have held that IRCA
does not preempt state labor law and tort remedies. The
dissent noted that in passing IRCA, Congress did not
demonstrate any intent to preempt state labor and
employment remedies.38 Moreover, the dissent believed
that state law did not present an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the objectives of IRCA.39
The Balbuena dissent appeared most troubled by the
policy implications of limiting injured workers’ rights
to lost earnings, which incidentally serves to punish the
undocumented worker to the advantage of the employ-
er.40 The tension between the Balbuena dissent and the
First Department majority was based largely on a fun-
damental disagreement as to whether employers are
incentivized or encouraged to violate IRCA when work-
ers’ rights to back pay are limited.
The dissent argued that the limitation on an
employer’s liability for an undocumented worker’s
injuries encourages the employer to hire workers with-
out examining their documentation, in violation of
IRCA.41 On the other hand, according to the dissent,
allowing illegal immigrants to receive lost earnings
would not have any significant impact on an immi-
grant’s decision to travel to the United States to work
illegally.42 To this point, the dissent noted that most ille-
gal immigrants come to the United States with hopes of
court had addressed whether, in light of IRCA and Hoff-
man, undocumented workers are precluded from recov-
ering lost wages under New York labor and tort laws. In
late December 2004, in this pair of cases, the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that undocumented
workers are not entitled to recover lost earnings dam-
ages for injuries based on wages they might have
earned illegally in the United States.19 Rather than com-
pletely precluding undocumented workers from entitle-
ment to back pay, the First Department held that they
are limited to lost earnings that they would have been
able to earn in their home countries.20
In Sanango, Arcenio Sanango, an undocumented
worker, was employed at a construction site when he
fell from a ladder and sustained serious injuries.21
Sanango commenced a Labor Law § 240 action against
the owner of the work site.22 The owner of the work site
then commenced a third-party action for indemnifica-
tion against Sanango’s employer.23 A jury awarded
Sanango substantial damages for pain and suffering
and medical bills, and also awarded him $96,000 in lost
earnings.24 Both the owner of the work site and Sanan-
go’s employer appealed from the judgment on the jury
verdict, arguing that in light of IRCA and Hoffman,
Sanango’s status as an undocumented worker barred or
limited his recovery for lost earnings.25 The First
Department (Nardelli, J.P., Saxe, Williams, Friedman, JJ.)
agreed and reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded
Sanango lost wages and remanded for a new trial on
the issue.26
The First Department held that “an award of dam-
ages . . . based on the United States wages plaintiff
might have earned unlawfully, but for his injury, would
‘unduly trench upon’ IRCA’s federal immigration policy
in substantially the same manner as . . . the NLRB back
pay award in Hoffman.”27 The court stated that allowing
Sanango to recover earnings he would have received
only by remaining in the United States illegally would
implicate the concerns expressed in Hoffman—namely,
encouraging illegal workers to evade immigration
authorities, condoning prior violations and encouraging
future violations.28 The court then “noted” that New
York state labor and tort laws were preempted by IRCA
because “even if a coequal federal statute, such as the
NLRA, must, under some circumstances, give way to
IRCA . . . it follows that state law . . . must give way to
IRCA, as well.”29
Rather than completely denying Sanango any
recovery of lost wages, however, the court held that
Sanango could receive damages for lost earnings based
on the prevailing wages in his country of origin.30 The
court did not provide any legal authority in support of
this conclusion, though it did state that it was unaware
of any federal policy that would be offended by the lim-
itation on lost earnings.31 The court held that this limita-
getting a job, at any wage, and often take the jobs in the
United States economy with the lowest pay and highest
level of danger.43 Thus, the unavailability of lost earn-
ings in a potential, future lawsuit would not likely fac-
tor into an immigrant’s decision to come to the United
States and obtain work illegally.44 Instead, the dissent
saw a more significant risk that the majority’s decision
would encourage employers to continue unscrupulous
business practices that violate state labor laws and
stoke the demand for illegal workers, thereby under-
mining the efforts of IRCA to deter employment of ille-
gal workers.45
The Sanango court criticized the dissent’s concern
as entirely theoretical, stating that “the potential limita-
tion of one item of damages (lost earnings) in a future
tort action is such a remote and uncertain benefit that it
would not constitute a real incentive to the employ-
ment of undocumented aliens.”46 The Sanango court
stated that any concern that employers were incen-
tivized to violate IRCA was negated by the facts that (1)
employers usually carry insurance coverage for tort lia-
bility and (2) violations of IRCA carried other criminal
and civil penalties.47 Moreover, the majority noted that
any incidental benefit to the employer at the expense of
the undocumented worker was a result of Hoffman’s
stated policy that undocumented workers should not
be compensated for wages that could only have been
earned illegally in the United States.48 Thus, the Sanan-
go court held that whether or not the First Department
agreed with Hoffman, Hoffman presented a conclusion
about federal immigration policy that the New York
court was bound to follow.49
Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc.: Finding a
Better Balance of Immigration Policy and Labor
Law § 240 Deterrence
The Sanango and Balbuena cases raise a threshold
question whether IRCA preempts New York State
Labor Law § 240 remedies. The majority gave this
threshold issue only summary treatment, and it
appears that the dissent was correct that IRCA does not
preempt Labor Law § 240 remedies. 
There is a presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law.50 A state law is preempted
by a federal law only if there is “such actual conflict
between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area”51 or if Congress has in some
other way unambiguously declared its intention to
foreclose the state law in question.52 There is no actual
conflict between the enforcement of IRCA and Labor
Law § 240 remedies. Moreover, Congress did not indi-
cate any intent that IRCA foreclose remedies under
state laws like Labor Law § 240.53 For these reasons, at
least one court has held that IRCA does not preempt
state labor law remedies.54
Whether or not IRCA preempts state labor and tort
remedies, the First Department could have adopted a
rule that more appropriately balances the competing
policy concerns. Certainly, in allowing injured, undocu-
mented workers some measure of lost earnings, the
First Department recognized the unfairness of a total
preclusion. However, the court could have enunciated a
principled rule that both recognizes Hoffman’s concern
that the law should not encourage and condone work-
ers’ IRCA violations and better weighs the economic
realities of the undocumented workforce.55
As the Sanango majority and Balbuena dissent exem-
plify, there exists a tension of economic incentives to
violate IRCA. On the one hand, allowing undocument-
ed workers to recover any measure of lost wages pro-
vides a “marginal incentive” for those workers to come
to the United States illegally.56 On the other, every time
an undocumented worker is denied a remedy, employ-
ers are provided another incentive to hire undocument-
ed workers.57
In addition, in cases that involve injured workers,
there are additional, competing policy concerns of the
Labor Law § 240 scheme. Labor Law § 240 aims to pro-
tect workers against work site accidents caused by haz-
ardous conditions.58 As the Balbuena dissent pointed
out, undocumented workers are often willing to take
the lowest paying and most dangerous jobs in the Unit-
ed States economy,59 compounding the significance of
Labor Law § 240 protections in this context.
The First Department’s blanket limitation on
injured, undocumented workers’ lost earnings to what
they would have been able to earn in their home coun-
tries does not fairly balance all of these concerns. It is
fundamentally unfair to punish an injured worker by
limiting her right to lost earnings, especially when this
limitation is applicable whether the employer or the
employee acted in violation of IRCA.60 At the same
time, removing the lost earnings limitation allows an
undocumented worker to recover lost United States
wages for work that could not be legally performed in
the United States. There is also the additional deter-
rence function of Labor Law § 240 and common law
tort remedies, which impose the threat of liability to
encourage employers and others to reduce the risk of
injuries to employees.61
With this deterrence principle and the competing
economic incentives in mind, in Rosa v. Partners in
Progress, Inc.,62 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
recently enunciated a rule that holds an employer (or
other party) liable for lost wages an undocumented
worker could have earned in the United States only
when that employer (or other party) knew or should
have known of the worker’s undocumented status.63 In
Rosa, just as in Balbuena and Sanango, an undocumented
worker was injured while working at a construction
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balance in Rosa. New Hampshire’s Rosa rule holds an
employer (or other party) liable for an undocumented
worker’s United States lost earnings only when that
employer (or other party) knew or should have known
of the worker’s immigration status. This rule recognizes
the economic realities of the undocumented workforce
and the deterrence function of Labor Law § 240 and,
thus, provides a more appropriate balance of policies
than the First Department’s blanket limitation.
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